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RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN MARYLAND
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE
FOR DRAFTING
Barry F. Rosent
Steven A. Loewytt
This article pro vides the Maryland lawyer with a practical guide
for drafting restrictive covenants in employment agreements.
The authors begin with a thorough analysis of the Maryland
case law addressing this sub ect area. They recommend the
types ofprovisions which will provide an employer with maxi-
mum protection againstfuture competition by departing employ-
ees. The writers conclude with a section on suggested drafting
techniques, keeping in mind that such provisions may have to
withstand judicial scrutiny should litigation occur.
I. INTRODUCTION
The fragile nature of many employment relationships makes it im-
perative for employers to secure protection against future competition
by departing employees. Protection can be obtained through a well-
drafted restrictive covenant in an employment agreement; however, an
attorney must be careful to draft in light of Maryland case law.
Sensitive and sophisticated legal questions arise when an attorney
must determine how to protect trade secrets, private customer informa-
tion and other confidential company materials to which an employee
may have access. The protection must forestall the effects of future
competition by present employees. Against this concern, the attorney
must weigh the interests of employees who will be vigilant to any con-
tractual language limiting their mobility in the marketplace. Further-
more, the public has a stake in the outcome of compromises negotiated
between an employer and employee. Restrictive covenants also touch
issues fundamental to the framework of the free society, including free-
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dom of contract, judicial interference in the market economy, restraint
of trade, the protection of proprietary rights, the free flow of labor, and
the possible equitable obligations of society in mitigating perceived un-
equal bargaining strengths between parties. A thorough and workable
knowledge of the Maryland law on restrictive covenants in employ-
ment agreements will help the attorney in balancing these competing
interests while providing the maximum possible protection for an
employer.
This article provides the Maryland practitioner with a practical
guide to the Maryland law addressing restrictive covenants in employ-
ment contracts.' The focus is on the realm of application, specifically,
the principles attorneys should adopt when drafting a restrictive cove-
nant so as to provide maximum protection for their clients. These
same principles can, of course, be employed to analyze an existing re-
strictive covenant in a litigation or advisory setting. The method
adopted to achieve the purpose of this article is to review the approxi-
mate two dozen Maryland decisions on the subject in order to identify
the legal principles affirmed by the Maryland courts and the drafting
guideposts which flow from such principles. 2
1. For a discussion of employee/employer rights absent an employment agreement
containing restrictive covenants, see Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md.
31, 37-39, 382 A.2d 564, 567-70 (1978). For a good discussion of Maryland Met-
als, Inc. v. Metzner, see 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 359 (1979).
2. The history of cases on this subject is older than the two dozen Maryland cases
discussed in this article. The earliest common law cases reflect a somewhat hostile
attitude toward covenants not to compete in employment contracts. See, e.g.,
Colgate Bachelor, 78 Eng. Rep. 1097 (Q.B. 1602); Anonymous, 72 Eng. Rep. 477
(K.B. 1577); Dyers Case, Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 5., f. 5, pl. 26 (C.P. 1414). For a good
discussion of these earlier cases, see Blake, Employment Agreements Not to Com-
pete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 629-37 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Blake].
The precursor of modern case law involving covenants in employment con-
tracts is Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711). This 18th century
decision set the foundation for more than two-and-one-half centuries of case law
by articulating the "rule of reason" guidelines later adopted in Maryland and
other jurisdictions. In Mitchel, the defendant subleased his bakery under an
agreement in which he promised not to compete within the local area during the
term of the lease. Id The court noted a presumption against the validity of all
restraints of trade, but upheld the enforceability of the restraint at issue because it
was reasonable. Id at 352. The Mitchel court distinguished between particular
and general restraints. Id. at 349. The general restraint is one in which area or
duration are unbounded, while a particular restraint is limited in scope. 'Id at
352. General restraints were held to be ipsofacto unreasonable, and therefore
invalid, while particular restraints were held valid if supported by "good and ade-
quate consideration involving a just and honest contract." Id. at 349, 352. Al-
though the facts involved a business transfer, the principles articulated were
applied by later courts directly to employment contracts.
Prior to this century, Mitchel v. Reynolds was "the fundamental authority to
be applied in employee-restraint cases . . . [and] cases which fail to cite it are
difficult to find." Blake, supra note 2, at 639. Early Maryland cases relied, in part,
on Mitchel. For example, in Guerand v. Dandelet, 32 Md. 561 (1870), the court
cited Mitchel, noting that "a contract ... in unlimited restraint of trade, or of any
particular vocation, is absolutely void, as being contrary to public policy, as well
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II. CASE LAW
A. The General Rule - Balancing Interests of the Employer vs. the
Hardships on the Employee
A restrictive covenant in an employment agreement must be "sup-
ported by adequate consideration and [be] ancillary to the employment
contract."3 If the covenant satisfies these two requirements, then the
general rule in Maryland is that an employee's agreement not to com-
pete with his employer upon leaving employment will be upheld "'if
the restraint is confined within limits which are no wider as to area and
duration than are reasonably necessary for the protection of the busi-
ness of the employer and [if the restriction] do[es] not impose undue
hardship on the employee or disregard the interests of the public.' "'
This rule establishes a balancing approach whereby the interests of the
employer, the hardships on the employee and the interests of the public
are weighed in order to determine whether a particular restriction will
be sustained.5
There is relatively little discussion in any of the Maryland cases
which actually addresses the third factor, the interests of the public.6
as oppressive in its operation upon individual industry." Id. at 566. The court,
consistent with Mitchel noted that partial restraints of trade or employment may
be lawful if reasonable and supported by sufficient consideration, while general
restraints meeting the same criteria may not be. 1d While Guerand involved a
restraint ancillary to the sale of a business, the principles adopted are inextricably
linked to the reasonableness principles later articulated in employment contract
cases. One of the earliest of these was Deuerling v. City Baking Co., 155 Md. 280,
141 A. 542 (1928), in which a general "fair and reasonable" standard was applied
in enforcing a restrictive covenant in an employment agreement. Id at 287, 141 A.
at 545. The standard set forth in Deuerling has been applied in later Maryland
cases with little alteration. See, e.g., Silver v. Goldberger, 231 Md. 1, 6-7, 188
A.2d 155, 158 (1963). As a consequence, Maryland courts have not veered sub-
stantially from the path forged nearly three hundred years ago in Mitchel.
3. Tawney v. Mutual Sys., Inc., 186 Md. 508, 513, 47 A.2d 372, 375 (1946). See also
Blake, supra note 2, at 626 n.3. The inference is that absent a larger transaction
which legitimizes the restraint, such as an employment agreement or a sale of a
business, a party cannot agree not to compete even upon the receipt of otherwise
adequate consideration. 1d
4. Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93, 96, 299 A.2d 835, 838 (1973) (quoting Ruhl v. F.A.
Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 245 Md. 118, 123-24, 225 A.2d 288, 291 (1967); Macin-
tosh v. Brunswick Corp., 241 Md. 24, 31, 215 A.2d 222, 225 (1965)).
5. See Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93, 96, 299 A.2d 835, 838 (1973); Massachusetts
Indem. & Life Ins. Co. v. Dresser, 269 Md. 364, 370, 306 A.2d 213, 217 (1973);
Ruhl v. F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 245 Md. 118, 127, 225 A.2d 288, 293 (1967);
Deuerling v. City Baking Co., 155 Md. 280, 284, 141 A. 542, 543-44 (1928); Hebb
v. Stump, Harvey & Cook, Inc., 25 Md. App. 478, 487-88, 334 A.2d 563, 569, cert.
denied, 275 Md. 749 (1975).
6. But see Deuerling v. City Baking Co., 155 Md. 280, 284, 141 A. 542, 544 (1928),
where the court stated:
The general public . . . are entitled to have the energy, industry, skill,
and talents of all individuals freely offered upon the market, and it can
easily be imagined that by unreasonable curtailment, through restrictive
covenants contained in contracts of employment, the public at large
Baltimore Law Review
There are a few scattered comments indicating that a court need not
concern itself with this aspect of the balancing test if a particular em-
ployer is not a monopolist.7 For the most part, however, this factor has
only been given lip service in the cases. Therefore, it would appear that
Maryland is ripe for an argument that a particular restrictive covenant
is too wide because of the interests of the public. For example, if a
particular employer is an especially dominant factor in a specific line of
commerce, a restrictive covenant aimed at protecting such an employer
may be susceptible to attack as contrary to the interests of the public.
Notwithstanding this potential, the Maryland cases have virtually
always dealt with balancing the interests of the employer against the
hardships on the employee.8 In this context Maryland has recognized
only two types of employers' interests which are entitled to the protec-
tion of a restrictive covenant.9 The first involves trade secrets and other
similar confidential information. For instance, where an employee can
take trade secrets or other confidential information to a competitor
which would thereby give that party a competitive advantage, then the
former employer has a valid interest on which to base a restrictive cov-
enant.' ° The second recognized employers' interest requires that the
employer's business be dependent in some way upon the employee to
the extent that the employee's departure will, in fact, divert business
away from the former employer because of something unique about the
employee." This second interest is usually expressed in terms of a con-
tinuum onto which all businesses fall. At one end of the continuum, a
buginess is totally dependent on the personality, skill, knowledge or
contacts of its employees for sales of its products or services. At the
other end, a business is totally dependent either on the price or quality
might thereby be deprived of the services of individuals so essential to
the progress, welfare, and happiness of mankind.
Id
7. See Ruhl v. F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 245 Md. 118, 127, 225 A.2d 288, 293
(1967).
8. See Millward v. Gerstung Int'l Sport Educ., Inc., 268 Md. 483, 488-89, 302 A.2d
14, 17 (1973).
9. Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93, 97, 299 A.2d 835, 838 (1973) (citing Ruhl v. F.A.
Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 245 Md. 118, 225 A.2d 288 (1967)); Silver v. Goldberger,
231 Md. 1, 188 A.2d 155 (1963); Tawney v. Mutual Sys., Inc., 186 Md. 508, 47
A.2d 372 (1946)).
10. See E.L. Conwell & Co. v. Gutberlet, 429 F.2d 527, 528 (4th Cir. 1970); Head Ski
Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919, 924 (D. Md. 1958). See also Tawney v.
Mutual Sys., Inc., 186 Md. 508, 521, 47 A.2d 372, 379 (1946) (recognizing trade
secret and confidentiality provisions in employment agreements to be restrictive
covenants).
11. E.L. Conwell & Co. v. Gutberlet, 429 F.2d 527, 528 (4th Cir. 1970); Becker v.
Bailey, 268 Md. 93, 97, 299 A.2d 835, 838 (1973); Budget Rent A Car, Inc. v.
Raab, 268 Md. 478, 482, 302 A.2d 11, 13 (1973); Millward v. Gerstung Int'l Sport
Educ., Inc., 268 Md. 483, 489, 302 A.2d 14, 17 (1973); Tuttle v. Riggs-Warfield-
Roloson, Inc., 251 Md. 45, 49-51, 246 A.2d 588, 590-91 (1968); Tolman Laundry v.
Walker, 171 Md. 7, 12, 187 A. 836, 838 (1936).
[Vol. II
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of its products or services.12 As long as a particular business can move
somewhere along the continuum away from being totally dependent on
the quality or price of its products or services, and somewhat depen-
dent on the personality, skill, knowledge or contacts of the employee,
then that business has a protectable interest which can support some
form of restrictive covenant.13
If a particular business does not possess at least one of these two
protectable interests, then there is nothing to balance against the obvi-
ous hardship on an employee who is saddled with a restrictive cove-
nant. Accordingly, if there is no recognizable interest on the part of the
employer, a restraint may not be enforced regardless of how reasonable
it appears.' 4 For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in EL. Conwell & Co. v. Guiberlet'" was presented with
one type of employment which was incapable of supporting any form
of restrictive covenant. Conwell involved an engineer who inspected
buildings after they were completed by his employer, a construction
company.' 6 The engineer possessed no particular trade secrets, and the
employer's business was in no way dependent upon the engineer's con-
tacts, personality or skill to such an extent that his departure could con-
ceivably divert business.'7 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that
no restrictive covenant could be sustained, no matter how reasonable.' 8
A similar conclusion was reached in Budget Rent A Car, Inc. v.
Raab. '" Budget's franchise agreement provided that upon termination
the franchisee could not enter the rent-a-car business for a certain pe-
12. See Millward v. Gerstung Int'l Sport Educ., Inc., 268 Md. 483, 488-89, 302 A.2d
14, 17 (1973). The Millward court noted:
[TIhere is a distinction "between the cases where business success is at-
tributable to the quality of the product being sold, and those where the
personal contact of the employee with the customer is an important fac-
tor. In the latter case, the employer has a stronger need for protection
against diversion of his business to the former employee who has had
personal contacts with customers which the employer lacks."
Id. (quoting Tuttle v. Riggs-Warfield-Roloson, Inc., 251 Md. 45, 49-50, 246 A.2d
588, 590 (1968)). See also, e.g., Budget Rent A Car, Inc. v. Raab, 268 Md. 478,
482, 302 A.2d 11, 13 (1973) (invalidating a restrictive covenant because the em-
ployee was unskilled and his services were not unique); Tuttle v. Riggs-Warfield-
Roloson, Inc., 251 Md. 45, 50, 246 A.2d 588, 590 (1968) (upholding a restrictive
covenant, finding the employer's business dependent on the former employee's
customer contacts); Tolman Laundry v. Walker, 171 Md. 7, 12, 187 A. 836, 838
(1936) (upholding a restrictive covenant because the employer was dependent on
the former employee's loyalty, maintenance of secrets, and agreement not to com-
pete); Rosenstein v. Zentz, 118 Md. 564, 85 A. 675 (1912) (invalidating a restric-
tive covenant because the services of the employee were not unique).
13. See Tawney v. Mutual Sys., Inc., 186 Md. 508, 515-18, 47 A.2d 372, 376-77 (1946).
14. See id at 519-20, 47 A.2d at 378.
15. 429 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970).
16. 298 F. Supp. 623, 624-25 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd, 429 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970).
17. 429 F.2d 527, 528 (4th Cir. 1970).
18. Id
19. 268 Md. 478, 302 A.2d 11 (1973).
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riod of time.2' In this case the franchisee's wife established a rent-a-car
business at the same location the day after Budget's franchise was ter-
minated. Although the attorneys for both parties directed their atten-
tion primarily to whether the spouse's action was within the ambit of
the restrictive covenant, 2' the Court of Appeals of Maryland decided
the case on other grounds. The court found that in this type of business
the franchisor was not dependent on the uniqueness of the franchisee
and that no trade secrets were involved.22 Consequently, no restrictive
covenant, no matter how reasonable, could be enforced.23
In both Conwell and Budget, the employers could have argued that
they had a protectable interest because they had expended money to
teach their employee or franchisee certain skills.24 Even though these
skills were not trade secrets, the employers could have contended that
an employer should be entitled to prevent an employee from using
these skills in competition with the employer for some period of time.
In Maryland, however, a restrictive covenant has never been enforced
merely because the employer may have taught the employee certain
skills. For instance, although the Court of Appeals of Maryland did
use taught skills in its balancing analysis in Ruhl v. F.A. Bartlett Tree
Expert Co., 25 it did not enforce the restrictive covenant without also
finding that the employer depended on the contacts of the employee
and that the employee's departure would divert business.2 6 Therefore,
taught skills alone will not be a sufficient basis upon which to support a
restrictive covenant in Maryland.
B. The Permissible Scope of Restrictive Covenants in Employment
Agreements.: The Standard of Reasonableness
In most cases there is some dependence by the employer on the
employee for the employee's contacts, skill or personality.27 Where
20. Id at 479, 302 A.2d at 12.
21. Id at 481, 302 A.2d at 13. The restrictive covenant provided that the franchisee
would not "directly or indirectly" enter the rent-a-car business after termination
of the agreement. Id See also Tuttle v. Riggs-Warfield-Roloson, Inc., 251 Md.
45, 50, 246 A.2d 588, 590 (1968).
22. 268 Md. 478, 482, 302 A.2d 11, 13 (1973).
23. Id
24. In Conwell this argument was raised but was rejected by the district court and
ignored by the Fourth Circuit. The district court noted that the employee had not
been subjected to any special prcqgram of instruction, but even if he had, this
"would at most allow a claim for insignificant money damages, but would not be
a basis for injunctive relief." 298 F. Supp. 623, 631 (D. Md. 1969), afftd, 429 F.2d
527 (4th Cir. 1970).
25. 245 Md. 118, 126-28, 225 A.2d 288, 293-94 (1967).
26. Id at 126-27, 225 A.2d at 293.
27. See, e.g., Millward v. Gerstung Int'l Sport Educ., Inc., 268 Md. 483, 489, 302 A.2d
14, 17 (1973). The court noted tlhat the personal contacts of an employee are an
important factor, when it stated: '[T]he employer has a stronger need for protec-
tion against diversion of his business to the former employee who has had per-
sonal contacts with customers [of the] employer." Id
[Vol. 11
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such dependence exists or where trade secrets are involved, a court will
weigh the employer's interest against the hardships on the employee to
determine whether the restriction is too long in duration or too wide in
area.
28
The Maryland courts have adopted a standard of reasonableness
when evaluating the scope of restrictive covenants in employment con-
tracts.29 They look to the particular facts and circumstances of each
case to determine if the duration of a restrictive covenant is reason-
able.3" For example, in cases where an employee serves customers on a
route, if the employer does not know the identity of all the customers
on the employee's route, then all that may be enforced is a very limited
restriction.3" The hardship on the employer is not great because all the
employer needs is time to replace the defecting employee, and as soon
as the new employee begins, the customers can just as easily purchase
from this employee as they did from the defecting one. Accordingly, in
such a case, a two-year restriction may very well be unreasonable,
while a three-month restriction is all that a court may enforce.32 On the
other hand, in a situation where sales are dependent upon the contacts
of the employee, and where the customer may only place one or two
orders a year, a two- or three-year restriction may be quite
28. See E.L. Conwell & Co. v. Gutberlet, 429 F.2d 527, 528 (4th Cir. 1970); Millward
v. Gerstung Int'l Sport Educ., Inc., 268 Md. 483, 489, 302 A.2d 14, 17 (1973);
Tuttle v. Riggs-Warfield-Roloson, Inc., 251 Md. 45, 50, 246 A.2d 588, 590 (1968);
Tawney v. Mutual Sys., Inc., 186 Md. 508, 521, 47 A.2d 372, 379 (1946); Tolman
Laundry v. Walker, 171 Md. 7, 12, 187 A. 836, 838 (1936). See also Ruhl v. F.A.
Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 245 Md. 118, 125, 225 A.2d 288, 292 (1967), where the
court recognized that "[tihe extent and importance of the personal contact of the
employee with the customers [is the main factor in] determining whether the re-
straint is a reasonable one for the protection of the employer's business." Id The
employer's interests in protecting customer contacts are discussed in Blake, supra
note 2, at 653-54, cited in Ruhl v. F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 245 Md. at 125
n.l, 225 A.2d at 293 n.l.
29. See Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93, 97, 299 A.2d 835, 838 (1973); Ruhl v. F.A.
Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 245 Md. 118, 124, 225 A.2d 288, 291 (1967); Deuerling v.
City Baking Co., 155 Md. 280, 283, 141 A. 542, 543 (1928).
30. Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93, 97, 299 A.2d 835, 838 (1973), where the court stated:
"[A] determination must be made based on the scope of each particular covenant
itself; and, if that is not too broad on its face, the facts and circumstances of each
case must be examined." Id See Ruhl v. F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 245 Md.
118, 124, 225 A.2d 288, 291 (1967); Deuerling v. City Baking Co., 155 Md. 280,
283, 141 A. 542, 543 (1928). See also Millward v. Gerstung Int'l Sport Educ., Inc.,
268 Md. 483, 487-88, 302 A.2d 14, 16 (1973) (citing Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93,
97, 299 A.2d 835, 838 (1973); Ruhl v. F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 245 Md. 118,
124, 225 A.2d 288, 291 (1967)).
31. See Tawney v. Mutual Sys., Inc., 186 Md. 508, 521, 47 A.2d 372, 379 (1946);
Deuerling v. City Baking Co., 155 Md. 280, 287-88, 141 A. 542, 545 (1928); Fulton
Grand Laundry Co. v. Johnson, 140 Md. 359, 362, 117 A. 753, 754 (1922).
32. See Tawney v. Mutual Sys., Inc., 186 Md. 508, 521, 47 A.2d 372, 379 (1946);
Deuerling %. City Baking Co., 155 Md. 280, 287, 141 A. 542, 545 (1928); Fulton
Grand Laundry Co. v. Johnson, 140 Md. 359, 362, 117 A. 753, 754 (1922).
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reasonable.33
Applying the reasonableness standard and tailoring the restriction
to the facts occurs not only with respect to duration, but also with re-
spect to area.34 In Tawney v. Mutual System, Inc.,35 the following re-
strictive covenant was at issue:
(J) to keep secret the names of or any information relative
to any past, p resent or prospective borrowers from and
customers of their employers;
(K) to refrain from using any information relative to such
borrowers and customers and not to persuade any such
borrowers or customers to do anything that might be to
the disadvantage of their employers;
(L) to so keep secret and to so refrain for a period of three
years from the date of termination of the employment;
(M) to refrain from engaging directly or indirectly in any
business compe wit that of their employers in the
Baltimore City tradin& area for a period of twoyears
from the date of termination of the employment. -6
The Tawney case involved a manager of a loan office who left his em-
ployer and set up a competing business.3 7 Paragraphs (J), (K) and (L)
were primarily aimed at keeping secret the names of borrowers who
had been dealing with the manager's former employer, and the court
found evidence that there was often repeat business from those borrow-
ers.38 Paragraph (M), on the other hand, did not concern specific cus-
tomers, but stated that the employee would not compete with the
employer anywhere in Baltimore City.
At first glance, the selection of Baltimore City as the geographic
area would appear reasonable. However, the court of appeals noted
that there were hundreds of thousands of people in Baltimore City with
whom neither the employee nor the employer had any contact during
the term of employment. 39 Consequently, the employer and the em-
ployee were on a perfectly equal footing with respect to competing for
33. See Ruh v. F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 245 Md. 118, 128-29, 225 A.2d 288, 293
(1967).
34. See id at 128-29, 225 A.2d at 294. It has been held, however, that an unlimited
area is, isofacto, unenforceable. See Macintosh v. Brunswick Corp., 241 Md. 24,
31, 215 A.2d 222, 225 (1965), where the court held that "the restraint imposed by
[the covenant] as to area is unlimited and,for that reason, the claim that the re-
straint was necessary to protect the business interests of the former employer is
unreasonable." Id (emphasis added). However, the same court has, under the
proper circumstances, enforced a covenant unlimited in area, where it is limited to
an identifiable group of customers. See Gill v. Computer Equip. Corp., 266 Md.
170, 180-81, 292 A.2d 54, 59 (1972).
35. 186 Md. 508, 47 A.2d 372 (1946).
36. Id at 511, 47 A.2d at 374.
37. Id
38. Id at 521, 47 A.2d at 379.
39. Id
[Vol. II
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the business of such potential borrowers. The court found that there
was no reason to restrict the employee from soliciting the business of
such persons and, therefore, severed paragraph (M) from the employ-
ment contract and refused to enforce it, but, with little comment,
agreed to enforce paragraphs (J), (K) and (L).'
The court in Tawney determined that a restrictive covenant drawn
in terms of a specific geographic area can only be enforced if that geo-
graphic area has a valid relationship to the business involved.4 Where
an employee contacts all or most of the potential customers in a geo-
graphic area, then it is reasonable for a restrictive covenant to be drawn
in terms of geography.42 However, in cases like Tawney, and in cases
dealing with stockbrokers and many other service professions, there are
simply too many potential customers in a geographic area which have
never been contacted by either the employee or the employer. There-
fore, in such cases the courts will not enforce a restrictive covenant
drawn in terms of geography.4 3 It must be remembered that a restric-
tion should be "no wider" than "reasonably necessary for the protec-
tion of the business of the employer."" Territories such as the one in
Tawney are simply wider than reasonably necessary to protect the in-
terests of the employer.45 When dealing with service employees such as
stockbrokers or insurance salesmen, restrictive covenants should, there-
fore, be drawn in terms of whom the employee has dealt with, or in
terms of the potential customers of the employer, but not simply in
gross geographic terms.
Under the reasoning of Tawney, one could also argue that a re-
strictive covenant is wider than necessary if it restricts an employee
from dealing with all of his employer's customers when the employee
had contact with only some of these customers. Nevertheless, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Tuttle v. Riggs- Wa)field-Roloson,
40. Id
41. Id Seealso Ruhl v. F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 245 Md. 118, 128-29, 225 A.2d
288, 294 (1967) (the court enforced a restrictive covenant couched in terms of
geographic area, finding the restriction to have a valid relationship to the business
activity of the employer).
42. See Ruh] v. F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 245 Md. 118, 128-29, 225 A.2d 288, 294
(1967); Tawney v. Mutual Sys., Inc., 186 Md. 508, 520-21, 47 A.2d 372, 378-79
(1946).
43. See Ruhl v. F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 245 Md. 118, 128, 225 A.2d 288, 294
(1967); Tawney v. Mutual Sys., Inc., 186 Md. 508, 521, 47 A.2d 372, 379 (1946).
But see Gill v. Computer Equip. Corp., 266 Md. 170, 180-81, 292 A.2d 54, 59
(1972) (involving a service profession and the court enforced a restrictive covenant
for an unlimited geographic area when the restriction was limited to identifiable
customers).
44. Silver v. Goldberger, 231 Md. 1, 6, 188 A.2d 155, 158 (1963).
45. See also Macintosh v. Brunswick Corp., 241 Md. 24, 31, 215 A.2d 222, 225 (1965);
Griffin v. Guy, 172 Md. 510, 514, 192 A. 359, 361 (1937) (recognizing that a re-
strictive covenant drawn in terms of geographic area will only be enforced where
such restriction is reasonable).
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Inc., 4 6 specifically stated that a restrictive covenant prohibiting an in-
surance salesman from dealing with his employer's customers was
"valid and enforceable."47 It does not appear, however, that the insur-
ance salesman actually argued that the provision was too broad be-
cause it covered customers with whom he had no contact. Moreover,
the equities in this case ran against the employee, since subsequent to
his leaving, his employer agreed to amend the covenant excluding spe-
cific customers from its purview.48 However, the one customer which
was the subject of the litigation was not excluded.
Subsequent to Tuttle, the court of appeals in Gill v. Computer
Equipment Corp.49 upheld a restrictive covenant which applied to the
customers of a particular division of an employer. The larger part of
the contact with customers of that division had been the responsibility
of the employee subject to the restrictive covenant.50 The court rea-
soned that if the covenant in Tuttle, which applied to all customers, was
valid then, afortiori, the covenant in Gill was also valid.5 Accord-
ingly, although the reasoning in Tawney could justify invalidating an
"all customers" covenant, the holding in Tuttle, notwithstanding its pe-
culiar facts, supports the validity of such clauses.52
Tawney also illustrates that the Maryland courts tend to be more
lenient with respect to their analysis of trade secret provisions.53 For
instance, the court of appeals has enforced restrictions against use and
disclosure of trade secrets and other confidential information, where
the restriction was so broad as to provide that the trade secret would
never be disclosed or used anywhere in the world.54 Therefore, the use
of a trade secret provision may often be, as was the case in Tawney,
more significant than the use of any other type of restrictive covenant.
The courts are not only concerned with the interests of the em-
ployer in determining the reasonableness of the particular restrictive
covenant, but are also concerned with the relevant hardships on the
particular employee.55 In this regard, however, the courts have not
46. 251 Md. 45, 246 A.2d 588 (1968).
47. Id at 49, 246 A.2d at 590.
48. Id at 48, 246 A.2d at 590.
49. 266 Md. 170, 292 A.2d 54 (1972).
50. Id at 180-81, 292 A.2d at 59.
51. Id at 181, 292 A.2d at 59.
52. In light of the subsequent case of Hebb v. Stump, Harvey & Cook, Inc., 25 Md.
App. 478, 334 A.2d 563, cert. denied, 275 Md. 749 (1975) (discussed in detail at
notes 80-87 and accompanying text infra), it is possible that a Maryland court
faced with a challenge to an "all customers" covenant today would rewrite the
covenant to apply only to customers with whom the employee had contact.
53. The protection of trade secrets is enforceable even apart from the written cove-
nant. See Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919, 923 (D. Md. 1958).
54. See id at 921. Since a trade secret is very easy for an employee to expropriate and
disseminate to a third party in a foreign jurisdiction, restrictions concerning such
property interests can be enforceable in an unlimited area.
55. See Ruhl v. F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 245 Md. 118, 128, 225 A.2d 288, 293
(1967).
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been very sympathetic to certain highly skilled employees, such as phy-
sicians or dentists, who are perceived to be able to start a new practice
in another town.56 Upon graduation from medical school, a doctor
might work for an established physician and agree that upon leaving
such employment he or she will not open a practice within ten miles of
the established physician's business for a period of two years. In such a
case, the established doctor does become dependent upon the personal
relationship which develops between the young associate and the estab-
lished physician's patients. Furthermore, the young doctor's departure
may very well divert business from the established physician's practice.
Therefore, the courts are willing to enforce reasonable restrictive cove-
nants in this area.57 The hardship on the young doctor is not perceived
as being of great magnitude because he or she may still use his or her
specialized skill to set up a practice outside the ambit of the restriction.
The best way to analyze the hardships a covenant creates for an
employee is to place the different types of restrictive covenants on a
continuum. At one end of the continuum are restrictive covenants
which prohibit any type of competition. These are obviously very
broad in scope and impose the greatest hardship on the employee.
Somewhere in the middle of the continuum are restrictive covenants
which restrain an employee from dealing with the employer's custom-
ers. This type of restriction is still broad, but not to the extent of the
first example, and the hardship imposed on the employee is not as ex-
tensive. Finally, at the other end of the continuum are restrictive cove-
nants which only prohibit an employee from soliciting customers of the
employer. These are the least broad of the three examples and impose
the least amount of hardship on the employee. 58
Tutle v. Riggs- Waofield-Roloson, Inc. 19 involved a restrictive cove-
nant similar to the second example illustrated above. In Tuttle, the cov-
enant prohibited the employee from engaging in any insurance
activities with his former employer's customers and was held to prevent
such customers from dealing with the employee even where the em-
ployee had not solicited the business.60 Had Tuttle involved only a
non-solicitation restrictive covenant, it would not have prevented the
customer from seeking out the employee, but would only have pre-
vented the employee from soliciting the customer.6
The third type of restrictive covenant illustrated above, one which
prohibits solicitation, is of great importance in Maryland since the
56. See Warfield v. Booth, 33 Md. 63, 69-70 (1870); Annot., 58 A.L.R. 156 (1929).
57. See Warfield v. Booth, 33 Md. 63, 69-70 (1870); Annot., 58 A.L.R. 156 (1929).
58. For a discussion of the different types of covenants, see Gill v. Computer Equip.
Corp., 266 Md. 170, 181, 292 A.2d 54, 59 (1972); Tuttle v. Riggs-Warfield-
Roloson, Inc., 251 Md. 45, 50, 246 A.2d 588, 590 (1968).
59. 251 Md. 45, 246 A.2d 588 (1968).
60. Id at 50, 246 A.2d at 590.
61. See id See also Budget Rent A Car, Inc. v. Raab, 268 Md. 478, 482, 302 A.2d 11,
13 (1973).
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courts have been unanimous in their enforcement of such covenants. 62
In fact, the court of appeals in Millward v. Gerstung International Sport
Education, Inc. 63 went so far as to enforce a covenant which provided
that the employee would never solicit the employer's customers. 64 Al-
though the particular restrictive covenant in Millward was not attacked
because of its excessive duration, it is still significant that the court of
appeals enforced the covenant, without even mentioning its duration.
The degree of the hardship of the covenant on the employee has
also been analyzed in terms of the cause of the particular employee's
termination.65 An identical restrictive covenant may be enforceable
where the employment is discontinued for one reason and unenforce-
able if the employment is discontinued for another. Where an em-
ployee has left voluntarily or where the employee has been fired for
cause, a court is more likely to enforce the restrictive covenant. 66 How-
ever, where the employee is discharged for a reason unrelated to his
performance, then the court is less likely to enforce the same restrictive
covenant.67 For example, where the employee is dismissed because of
a merger or because sales are generally down, resulting in a need to cut
the sales force, Maryland courts are less likely to enforce the restrictive
covenant.68 Therefore, a draftsman might consider writing separate re-
62. See Millward v. Gerstung Int'l Sport Educ., Inc., 268 Md. 483, 487-89, 302 A.2d
14, 16-17 (1973); Deuerling v. City Baking Co., 155 Md. 280, 288, 141 A. 542, 545
(1928).
63. 268 Md. 483, 302 A.2d 14 (1973).
64. Id at 485, 302 A.2d at 15. See also Griffin v. Guy, 172 Md. 510, 192 A. 359
(1937), where the court stated, "It is established that contracts in restraint of trade
may be without limit as to time." Id at 510, 192 A. at 361. It is questionable,
however, whether this statement from Griffin is still the law in light of the general
rule that such covenants may be no wider as to area and duration than is reason-
ably necessary. Silver v. Goldberger, 231 Md. 1, 6, 188 A.2d 155, 158 (1963).
65. See Macintosh v. Brunswick Corp., 241 Md. 24, 31, 215 A.2d 222, 225 (1965),
where the court stated:
Moreover, since the employee was discharged through no fault of his
own. . . and, as a result, the employee had been unemployed for more
than two months because his previous training and experience had nec-
essarily limited the type of work he could skillfully perform . . . , it is
apparent that the duration of the restrictive covenant had the effect of
imposing undue hardship on the employee.
Id
66. See Hebb v. Stump, Harvey & Cook, Inc., 25 Md. App. 478, 486-87, 334 A.2d 563,
568-69, cert. denied 275 Md. 749 (1975), where the court stated:
In cases of termination "for cause" by the employer there are often
engendered elements of hostility, ill will and malice . . . which would
give greater rise, under such terminations "for cause," for the employer
to be required to protect itself from the competition of an employee leav-
ing its employ under such circumstances.
Id See also Ruhl v. F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co., 245 Md. 118, 128, 225 A.2d
288, 293-94 (1967).
67. See Macintosh v. Brunswick Corp., 241 Md. 24, 31, 215 A.2d 222, 225 (1965);
Hebb v. Stump, Harvey & Cook, Inc., 25 Md. App. 478, 486-87, 334 A.2d 563,
568-69, cert. denied, 275 Md. 749 (1975).
68. See Macintosh v. Brunswick Corp., 241 Md. 24, 31, 215 A.2d 222, 225 (1965);
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strictive covenants for terminations which result through no fault of the
employee.
III. THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF RESTRICTIVE
COVENANTS WHICH MAY BE INCLUDED
WITHIN AN EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
There are at least four types of restrictive covenants affecting com-
petition after employment: an employee may be restricted from com-
peting in any way with his or her employer; an employee may be
restricted from dealing in any way with the customers of the employer;
an employee may be restricted from soliciting the customers of the em-
ployer; and an employee may be restricted from using or disclosing the
trade secrets or other confidential information of the employer.69
In drafting a restrictive covenant, an attorney might analyze the
business involved and pick and choose among these four to determine
which are most applicable to a particular situation and, therefore,
which should be included in an employment agreement. The practi-
tioner might instead include all four of the covenants with a provision
that all four are cumulative. The risk attendant to the latter decision is
that a court might pick and choose between covenants and decide not
to enforce the greatest restriction.7" On the other hand, failing to pick
the proper restriction might result in a court not enforcing any restric-
tion.7' Therefore, it is advisable to take the route illustrated by Tawney
v. Mutual System, Inc., 72 where several restrictive covenants are set out
in separate paragraphs and where, even if a court severs one restrictive
covenant, there are still several others remaining.73
IV. WILL MARYLAND COURTS REWRITE A DEFECTIVE
RESTRICTIVE COVENANT OR USE A "BLUE
PENCIL" APPROACH?
Although the Maryland courts have severed separate restrictive
covenants from an employment contract,'7 they have only once, argua-
bly, rewritten a restrictive covenant.75 Historically, if a restrictive cove-
Hebb v. Stump, Harvey & Cook, Inc., 25 Md. App. 478, 486-87, 334 A.2d 563,
568-69, cert. denied, 275 Md. 749 (1975).
69. Another categorization of covenants was recognized in Deuerling v. City Baking
Co., 155 Md. 280, 283, 141 A. 542, 543 (1928). This categorization includes: (1)
covenants not to compete for a term after employment has ended; and (2) cove-
nants not to work for someone else while employed with the contracting em-
ployer. Id
70. See Tawney v. Mutual Sys. Inc., 186 Md. 508, 521, 47 A.2d 372, 379 (1946).
71. See Macintosh v. Brunswick Corp., 241 Md. 24, 31, 215 A.2d 222, 225-26 (1965).
72. 186 Md. 508, 47 A.2d 372 (1946).
73. See notes 35-45 and accompanying text supra.
74. See Tawney v. Mutual Sys. Inc., 186 Md. 508, 47 A.2d 372 (1946).
75. See Hebb v. Stump, Harvey & Cook, Inc., 25 Md. App. 478, 334 A.2d 563, cert.
denied, 275 Md. 749 (1975).
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nant was overbroad, e.g., if it applied to the entire country, the
Maryland courts did not attempt to rewrite the covenant so that it ap-
plied only to Maryland. 6 If a covenant was overbroad, it was unen-
forceable and severed from the contract. Prior to 1975, the closest the
Maryland courts had come to indicating any willingness to rewrite a
restrictive covenant was in cases such as Becker v. Bailey, 77 where in
dicta the court stated that it might have approved an injunction against
solicitation of former customers where the covenant was directed at all
forms of competition, but not solicitation in particular. 8 In Becker, the
court pointed out that there was no evidence of such solicitation and,
therefore, it did not reach the issue.79
In 1975, however, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland ar-
guably rewrote a restrictive covenant in Hebb v. Stump, Harvey & Cook,
Inc. " The restrictive covenant at issue was as follows:
It is further agreed that if, after this year (1971) you cease to
be employed by Stump, Harvey & Cook, Inc. you will refrain,
for a period of one year (or for a period of two years in the
event of a renewal for an additional year or more) beginning
with the date of such termination from engaging either di-
rectly or indirectly in writing or soliciting the writing of con-
tracts of insurance of our customers, andprospective customers
who were being actively solicited by us at or before the effec-
tive date of such termination.8'
The court in Hebb first determined that prohibiting the employee from
soliciting or writing contracts with prospective customers was too
broad, and it therefore severed that provision.82 Secondly, the court
determined that it would also be unreasonable to prevent the employee
from soliciting or writing contracts of insurance with customers which
the employee was already dealing with when he joined this employer.8 3
Therefore, the court severed this class of customers from the restriction,
notwithstanding the fact that this class of customers was not specifically
mentioned.84
The case is not clear, however, as to whether the court of special
76. See Maclntosh v. Brunswick Corp., 241 Md. 24, 31, 215 A.2d 222, 225 (1965);
Brown v. Fraley, 222 Md. 480, 484-85, 161 A.2d 128, 131(1960). For a general
examination of how other jurisdictions handle restrictive covenants that are over-
broad in area, see Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 397, 440 (1975 & Supp. 1981).
77. 268 Md. 93, 299 A.2d 835 (1973). See also Anderson v. Truitt, 158 Md. 193, 148
A. 223 (1929) (court recognized as unanswered the question of whether a court
would enforce a less restrictive noncompetition provision than the one written in
the employment contract).
78. 268 Md. 93, 102, 299 A.2d 835, 840 (1973).
79. Id
80. 25 Md. App. 478, 334 A.2d 563, cert. denied, 275 Md. 749 (1975).
81. Id at 481, 334 A.2d at 566 (emphasis added).
82. Id at 487, 334 A.2d at 569.
83. Id at 492, 334 A.2d at 571.
84. Id
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appeals reached its decision based on the reference to "our customers"
in the covenant or based on the court's belief that it could rewrite cove-
nants to enforce the parties' intentions. The court could have found
that the term "our customers" was ambiguous and that the customers
who the employee brought with him when he joined this employer
were simply not within the restriction. Although the court mentioned
this possible interpretation, 85 the court also cited Professor Williston
for the proposition that restrictive covenants should be partially en-
forced even where they are too broad on their own terms.8 6 In this
regard, the court in Hebb quoted the following passage from Williston:
"Although a contract may contain excessively restrictive
promises which are unenforceable, the contract may not be
invalidated in its entirety where its general purpose is lawful.
Moreover, although one of several covenants in restraint of
trade is legally excessive, the separable restrictive promises,
which are lawful, will be enforced. This is true where the re-
straint is over-broad in its definition of the circumscribed ter-
ritory, its duration, the nature of the business activity affected,
or the classes of persons with whom the promisor engages not
to do business. '
Although the above passage hardly establishes the proposition that
overbroad covenants should be rewritten by the courts so as to give
effect to the parties' intentions, Williston does cite with approval a sin-
gle Alabama case in which the court clearly rewrote a restrictive cove-
nant.88 In this regard, Williston states, "[elven though the contract fails
to define the territory covered, the court will interpret it in the light of
the attendant circumstances, such as the influence of the business pro-
tected, to determine, if possible, the extent of territory intended to be
embraced."89
Notwithstanding the views of Williston, in the majority of cases
from various jurisdictions, the courts have not rewritten covenants, but
have followed what is known as the "blue pencil rule." 90 Professor
Corbin has described the blue pencil rule as follows:
By this rule, the divisibility of a promise in excessive re-
straint of trade is determined by purely mechanical means: if
the promise is so worded that the excessive restraint can be
eliminated by crossing out a few of the words with a "blue
85. Id
86. Id at 490, 334 A.2d at 570.
87. Id. (quoting 14 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1647B,
at 285-88 (3d ed. 1972), incorrectly cited by the court as 4 S. WILLISTON ON CON-
TRACTS § 1647B, at 287-88 (3d ed. 1961)).
88. Davis v. Christopher, 219 Ala. 346, 122 So. 406 (1929), cited in 14 S. WILLISTON,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1647B, at 289 (3d ed. 1972).
89. 14 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1647B, at 289 (3d
ed. 1972).
90. See 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1390, at 67 (1962).
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pencil," while at the same time the remaining words consti-
tute a complete and valid contract, the contract as thus "blue
penciled" will be enforced.9'
If the wording of the contract itself, however, provides no line of divi-
sion, then the "blue pencil" will not be applied, and the entire restric-
tive covenant will be deleted.92
Professor Corbin criticizes the "blue pencil" approach. He states
that "[b]y some occult process, the courts adopting this rule convinced
themselves that partial enforcement without the aid of a 'blue pencil'
would be 'making a new contract for the parties' while partial enforce-
ment in the wake of a 'blue pencil' is not."93 Professor Corbin adopts
the position of what he believes are the "best considered modem cases"
where courts have "decreed enforcement as against a defendant whose
breach has occurred within an area in which restriction would clearly
be reasonable, even though the terms of the agreement imposed a
larger and unreasonable restraint." 94  Accordingly, Corbin clearly
adopts the position that a court should rewrite a restrictive covenant in
order to enforce the intentions of the parties.
Other commentators have similarly approved this modem posi-
tion, but with certain caveats. Both the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts and Professor Blake take the position that a court should enforce
a narrower restriction than the one written, even when this cannot be
done simply by "blue pencilling," as long as it appears fair to do so.95
Both authorities adopt this concept of fairness to insure that employers
do not write excessively broad provisions unfairly, with knowledge
that, at worst, courts will narrowly enforce those provisions. In this
regard, Professor Blake states:
If the court is persuaded that the employer's policy and
practice with respect to employee restraints generally is fair
and desig&ned only to protect legitimate interests, the court
should tailor the covenant to provide such protection with the
minimum burden to the employee. When it seems likely that
the employer exacts the restriction for whatever advantage he
91. Id at 67-68.
92. Id at 69.
93. Id at 68.
94. Id at 70-7 1.
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184, Comment b (1981); Blake, supra
note 2, at 683. The text of § 184 of the Restatement is similar to Williston's posi-
tion in that it is not as clear as it could be. Its exact wording does not necessarily
imply that a court should rewrite overly broad restrictive covenants where the
intention of the parties can be gleaned. However, this is clearly what is done in
Illustration 3 to Comment b. Moreover, the Reporter's Note specifically states
that this section is rejecting the "blue pencil rule" of RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 518 (1932). Curiously, while Williston and § 518 of the first Restate-
ment appear to be advocating different approaches, both were cited with approval
in Hebb v. Stump, Harvey & Cook, Inc., 25 Md. App. 478, 490-91, 334 A.2d 563,
570-71, cert. denied, 275 Md. 749 (1975).
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can get from eliminating the employee's mobility and bar-
gainng power, or that he has not accorded employees' interest
sufficient weight in devising and administering the restraints,
severance should be denied. Courts should not aid and abet
the grasping or negligent employer by reforming an unreason-
ably restrictive covenant.96
While Professor Blake focuses on employment contracts, the prob-
lem inherent in the analysis of both Professor Corbin and the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts is that they unnecessarily confuse restrictive
covenants associated with the sale of businesses with restrictive cove-
nants found in employment contracts. Both Professor Corbin and the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts use sale of business examples to il-
lustrate why a court should rewrite an otherwise overly broad restric-
tive covenant.97 The example given by both commentators can be
paraphrased as follows: a seller of a local business agrees not to open a
competing business in the entire state or nation. The seller then opens
a competing business next door to that of the purchaser and argues that
the restriction is overly broad and, therefore, not enforceable. 9
Clearly, in such a case, courts would be tempted to rewrite the restric-
tion, notwithstanding that it is not susceptible to "blue pencilling." In
the sale of a business case, however, it can be readily seen that the
purchaser is entitled to some protection. In fact, at least one court has
held that a seller of a business may not open a competing business
within the same area, notwithstanding the fact that there is no written
provision prohibiting such action. 99
Unlike the sale of business cases, there is often no analogous com-
pelling reason to protect any employer from the competition of a de-
fecting employee. The employer is already protected from many
unlawful actions of a departing employee even though an employment
agreement does not exist. For instance, the law protects the employer
from the employee's solicitation of customers prior to leaving,co the
96. Blake, supra note 2, at 683-84. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 184, Comment b (1981), which states:
[A] court will not exercise this discretion in favor of a party unless it
appears that he made the agreement in good faith and in accordance
with reasonable standards of fair dealing .... For example, a court
will not aid a party who has taken advantage of his dominant bargaining
power to extract from the other party a promise that is clearly so broad
as to offend public policy by redrafting the agreement so as to make a
part of the promise enforceable.
Id
97. 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1390, at 71-73 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 184, Comment b, Illustration 3 (1981).
98. See 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1390, at 71-73 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND.)
OF CONTRACTS § 184, Comment b, Illustration 3 (1981).
99. Mohawk Maintenance Co. v. Kessler, 52 N.Y.2d 276, 419 N.E.2d 324, 437
N.Y.S.2d 646 (1981).
100. Maryland Metals, Inc. v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 38, 382 A.2d 564, 568 (1978).
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employee's taking of books, records or customer lists,' 0 and the em-
ployee's misuse of the employer's trade secrets.' 0 2 However, the law
does not restrict an employee from competing with his or her former
employer absent an employment agreement, notwithstanding that it
may have been reasonable for the employer to restrict such activities in
writing. 0 3 The law generally favors competition and the mobility of
the labor force."o Accordingly, the position of the courts should be that
an employer should either write a restrictive covenant properly and
reasonably or risk having the entire restrictive covenant held unen-
forceable, or at best, "blue pencilled." This philosophy would better
influence employers to write employment agreements as reasonably as
possible, rather than asking courts to determine the fairness of the ne-
gotiating or bargaining process on some ad hoc basis.
In any case, it appears that the trend is towards courts rewriting
restrictive covenants where to do so would give effect to the intentions
of the parties, as long as it is believed that the agreement was made in
good faith and in accordance with standards of fair dealing. Moreover,
even though Hebb v. Stump, Harvey & Cook, Inc. "' was decided by the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, and although the facts of that
case would have allowed the court to reach its finding without rewriting
the covenant, the case, nevertheless, can be used to support this modern
trend. Therefore, the possibility that a Maryland court will rewrite a
restrictive covenant should not only be considered in the litigation con-
text, but also when drafting restrictive covenants.
Assuming that Hebb does stand for the proposition that a court
should attempt to rewrite certain provisions, a draftsman should also
consider adding a provision to an employment contract which states
that it is the intention of the parties that if any restrictive covenant in
the employment agreement is determined to be overly broad, then the
court should enforce it to the maximum extent permitted under law as
to area and duration. Based on a very reasonable reading of Hebb and
dicta in cases like Becker v. Bailey, 106 such a provision should be en-
forceable in Maryland. 07
101. See Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R.E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74, reh'g
denied and opinion supplemented, 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 699, cert. denied, 382 U.S.
843 (1965).
102. Id. at 117, 208 A.2d at 86.
103. 1d. at 113, 208 A.2d at 84.
104. Id.
105. 25 Md. App. 478, 334 A.2d 563, cert. denied, 275 Md. 749 (1975).
106. 268 Md. 93, 299 A.2d 835 (1973).
107. See Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93, 299 A.2d 835 (1973); Hebb v. Stump, Harvey &
Cook, Inc., 25 Md. App. 478, 334 A.2d 563, cert. denied, 275 Md. 749 (1975).
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V. DRAFTING RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
4. How to Draft a Restrictive Covenant
Once the types of restrictive covenants to be included in an em-
ployment agreement are selected, then an attorney must decide how to
write the restrictions. Possibly the best place to start is to determine
how not to write a restrictive covenant. The restrictive covenant dis-
cussed in E.L. Con well & Co. v. Gutberlet "8 is illustrative. The restric-
tion in Conwell provided: "Should your employment with us be
terminated for any reason you will not accept employment with a com-
petitor or client of ours nor engage in a competing business venture
within 150 miles of Baltimore for a period of three years after the ter-
mination.""09 Most attorneys might reason that this provision was held
unenforceable because the 150-mile and three-year restrictions were
unreasonable with respect to area and duration. Actually, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit never even reached
these issues. It construed the restrictive covenant to contain two sepa-
rate prohibitions: (1) the employee could not accept employment with a
competitor or client; and (2) the employee could not engage in a com-
peting business venture." 0° The Fourth Circuit then concluded that
only the second prohibition was modified with respect to 150 miles and
three years and that the first prohibition contained no restriction what-
soever as to geography or duration.' Since the employer was attempt-
ing to enforce only the first restriction, the court held that it was totally
unreasonable and unenforceable because it covered an infinite period
and area.' 12
Based upon the court's determination in Conwell, the answer to the
question of how to write restrictive covenants is to write them carefully.
Restrictive covenants should be divided into separate paragraphs as
much as possible and, if possible, into separate sentences. Each sen-
tence should clearly answer the following questions: (1) how long?; (2)
where or who?; and (3) what?
The "how long" question, of course, refers to duration. In this con-
text, it should be remembered that the courts of Maryland have ap-
proved varying lengths of duration depending on the type of restrictive
covenant at issue. Accordingly, the same contract might have a two-
year period for dealing with customers, a three-year period for solicita-
tion I I3 and an infinite period for the nondisclosure of trade secrets.' 14
Modification as to area is really either a "where" or "who" ques-
108. 429 F.2d 527 (4th Cir. 1970).
109. Id at 528.
110. Id.
111. Id
112. Id
113. Tawney v. Mutual Sys., Inc., 186 Md. 508, 511, 47 A.2d 372, 374 (1946).
114. See E.L. Conwell & Co. v. Gutberlet, 429 F.2d 527, 528 (4th Cir. 1970); Head Ski
Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919, 923 (D. Md. 1958).
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tion. Sometimes area is defined in terms of geography, but as seen in
Tawney v. Mutual System, Inc.," 5 it is often defined in terms of the
people with whom the employee may not deal." 6
Finally, although it has not been given a great amount of attention
in Maryland, each restrictive covenant should also answer the question,
"what"? 1 7 What is the employee being restricted from doing? Is he or
she restricted from competing in any way with the employer or only
restrained from competing in certain ways? A salesman of one em-
ployer may take a non-sales job with the employer's competitor. Is the
employee competing with the first employer? Similarly, there may be
many allied fields which are somehow competitive with the employer's
business. Is the employee restricted from taking the same type of em-
ployment, but in an allied field? At least one Maryland case has indi-
cated that a restriction may be overbroad because it includes allied
fields." '8 Care should therefore be taken in defining what exactly it is
that the employee is restricted from doing. An overbroad provision in
this regard may be severed from the employment agreement on the the-
ory that it is simply wider than necessary to protect the employer's
business. Therefore, from the employer's point of view, there should be
other less restrictive covenants available for enforcement. On the other
hand, even in the absence of another less restrictive provision, an em-
ployer could hope that a court would adopt the approach used in Hebb
v. Stump, Harvey & Cook, Inc. "' and rewrite the overbroad
restriction. 20
B. Drafting Specft Provisions-Flexibility
When writing restrictive covenants, an attorney should also recog-
nize that the employer's business will change over time and that the
employment agreement should be written so that it is flexible enough to
deal with such changes. For instance, employment agreements often
state that the employee is restricted for two years after the "term of the
employment agreement." Although the term of the employment agree-
ment may be only two years, it is possible that the employee might be
employed for fifteen or twenty years. Unless the employer amends the
covenant to end when employment is terminated, he can be sure that
the employee, upon departure, will argue that the restrictive covenant
should be narrowly construed' 2' and that it became unenforceable after
115. 186 Md. 508, 47 A.2d 372 (1946).
116. Id at 521, 47 A.2d at 379.
117. See Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93, 96, 299 A.2d 835, 838 (1973); Maclntosh v.
Brunswick Corp., 241 Md. 24, 31, 215 A.2d 222, 225 (1965).
118. Maclntosh v. Brunswick Corp., 241 Md. 24, 30-31, 215 A.2d 222, 225 (1965).
119. 25 Md. App. 478, 334 A.2d 563, cert. denied, 275 Md. 749 (1975).
120. Id at 487, 334 A.2d at 570-71.
121. Tawney v. Mutual Sys., Inc., 186 Md. 508, 521, 47 A.2d 372, 379 (1946). A restric-
tive covenant in an employment agreement is strictly construed against the party
drafting it. E.L. Conwell & Co. v. Gutberlet, 429 F.2d 527, 528 (4th Cir. 1970);
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two years of employment. 
22
Although other jurisdictions have rejected this argument on the
part of employees, 23 this issue has not been dealt with squarely in
Maryland. There is authority in Maryland finding that provisions of a
written employment contract continue as implied terms of employment
after expiration of the written contract. 124 Therefore, the rule in other
jurisdictions would probably be followed in Maryland. Nevertheless,
an employee will not be able to make this argument if the employment
agreement is drafted properly. It is therefore advisable to draft restric-
tive covenants so that the employee is prohibited from, for example,
competing with or soliciting customers for a specific period of time af-
ter the cessation of employment.
Similarly, the termination provisions of an employment contract
may state that the provisions of the agreement are null and void upon
the happening of a specified event. However, many provisions, includ-
ing restrictive covenants, are intended to continue beyond termination.
Therefore, such provisions should be exempted from the termination
provision.
Similar care should be taken with respect to arbitration provisions
included in employment contracts. A broad arbitration provision
might be used by an employee to prevent an employer from obtaining
injunctive relief against the employee upon termination of employ-
ment. The employee would argue that all disputes are to be deter-
mined by arbitration and, therefore, until such arbitration is completed,
the employer should not be permitted to seek injunctive relief from the
court. Accordingly, arbitration provisions should make it clear that an
employer is permitted to seek injunctive relief in order to enforce re-
strictive covenants both before and during arbitration proceedings.
The concept of fluidity should also be built into the employment
agreement with respect to the territory covered or the functions per-
formed by the employee. At the time the employment agreement is
written, the employee may only be responsible for sales in one particu-
lar territory, but by the time the employee leaves, he or she may be
servicing a much larger territory. If a restrictive covenant is to have a
geographical limitation, then the geographical limitation should be
written in terms of the area serviced by the employee, and not fixed at
Hebb v. Stump, Harvey & Cook, Inc., 25 Md. App. 478, 487, 334 A.2d 563, 567,
cert. denied, 275 Md. 749 (1975).
122. See Art Wire & Stamping Co. v. Johnson, 141 N.J. Eq. 101, 102, 56 A.2d 11, 12
(1947).
123. Id
124. Brandenburg v. S.F.&G. Co., 207 Md. 413, 114 A.2d 604 (1955) (where employ-
ment is continued beyond the term of an original contract, such employment is
continued on the terms of the original contract). See also Hebb v. Stump, Harvey
& Cook, Inc., 25 Md. App. 478, 334 A.2d 563 (restrictive covenants will be en-
forced and construed in accordance with the common sense intent of the parties),
cert. denied, 275 Md. 749 (1975).
the point of initial employment. Furthermore, if a restrictive covenant
is to prevent an employee from taking certain types of jobs with a com-
petitor, then it, too, should be written broadly enough to encompass the
possibility that the employee may expand his or her duties prior to
termination.
C. Bonus Provisions
The obligation of many employers to compensate an employee
with a bonus or other financial remuneration after termination requires
the addition of another paragraph to the employment agreement. The
provision should state that in addition to all other remedies the em-
ployer may have for violation of the restrictive covenants, the employer
is also relieved of the obligation to make such bonus payments. With-
out such a provision, the breach of the restrictive covenant will likely
be viewed as a nonmaterial breach which does not relieve the employer
of the obligation to make bonus payments and, therefore, the em-
ployer's remedies will be restricted to seeking injunctive relief and ob-
taining damages flowing from the breach.'25 Including such a
provision does not necessarily mean that it will be enforced. A court
may find that an employee earned the bonuses for services rendered
and thus only allow the employer to obtain injunctive and monetary
relief flowing from the breach itself. 2 6 However, by including the sug-
gested provision, the employer will at least be able to argue that he has
the right to withhold such bonuses.
A more sophisticated approach to the bonus problem might be to
attribute a specific portion of the salaries or bonuses earned by an em-
ployee to the employee's promise not to compete with the employer
after termination. Then, the withholding of bonuses would be related
to the breach of the restrictive covenant, giving the employer a strong
argument against granting the bonuses for services rendered. In recent
years, other jurisdictions have enforced restrictive covenants only if
there was evidence of independent consideration for the restriction. 27
Although the Maryland courts have only raised this issue in passing, 28
125. See Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co. v. Dresser, 269 Md. 364, 306 A.2d 213
(1973).
126. See Macintosh v. Brunswick Corp., 241 Md. 24, 31, 215 A.2d 222, 225 (1965).
127. See Beaver Prods., Inc. v. Johnston, 335 So. 2d 59 (La. Ct. App. 1976); James C.
Green, Co. v. Kelley, 261 N.C. 166, 134 S.E.2d 166 (1964); Mail-Well Envelope
Co. v. Saley, 262 Or. 143, 497 P.2d 364 (1972); Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 825, 829-33
(1973 & Supp. 1981).
128. See Becker v. Bailey, 268 Md. 93, 96, 299 A.2d 835, 838 (1973) (court noted that a
restrictive covenant in an employment agreement must be "supported by ade-
quate consideration"); Budget Rent A Car, Inc. v. Raab, 268 Md. 478, 482, 302
A.2d 11, 13 (1973) (court recognized that a restrictive covenant will only be en-
forceable if it is supported by adequate consideration). Compensation for an em-
ployee's services may also be consideration for a restrictive covenant in the
employment contract. Deuerling v. City Baking Co., 155 Md. 280, 287, 141 A. 542,
544 (1928). The court will not inquire as to whether consideration is sufficient, but
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the Maryland attorney might include a recitation relating the payment
of bonuses or other remuneration to particular restrictive covenants.
Such a provision would not only support the withholding of bonuses
should a breach occur, but it would also deter the type of arguments
accepted in other states which have invalidated restrictive covenants for
lack of independent consideration.
D. Trade Secret Provisions
Since the Maryland courts tend to be liberal in enforcing trade
secret provisions,1 29 and since the provisions often give the employer
the greatest possible protection, 30 great care should be taken in draft-
ing them. Employees should be restricted from directly or indirectly
using or disclosing confidential material and taking any copies of confi-
dential material with them after employment is terminated. Moreover,
the terms "trade secrets" and "other confidential information" should
be carefully defined for purposes of the agreement. The employment
agreement should state that it is presumed, or that the parties agree,
that certain information, whether written or otherwise, constitutes trade
secrets and confidential information. An illustrative list might include
all information concerning customers, customer lists, costs, prices, earn-
ings, products, formulae, compositions, machines, apparatus, systems,
manufacturing procedures, prospective and executed contracts and
other business arrangements, and sources of supply. The provision
might state that all of the above are presumed to constitute confidential
trade secrets and confidential information unless they are otherwise
lawfully and readily available to the general public. This last caveat, in
fact, need not even be included. An employer may take the position
that the employee has agreed by contract not to disclose any informa-
tion revealed to him or her and that all such information, whether con-
fidential or not, is protected from use or disclosure should the employee
decide to leave.
Maryland courts have on several occasions enforced very broad
only whether it is valuable. "It is the general rule that a valuable and not a suffi-
cient consideration is all that is required, unless the disparity between what is
given and what is received is such as to indicate fraud." Griffin v. Guy, 172 Md.
510, 516, 192 A. 359, 361 (1937). Accord Blake, supra note 2, at 631. But see
Tolman Laundry v. Walker, 171 Md. 7, 11-12, 187 A. 836, 838 (1936). While the
To/man court expressly required "sufficient consideration," six months later, in
Griffin, the same court interpreted the "sufficient consideration" requirement in
Tolman to mean "valuable consideration." 172 Md. at 516, 192 A. at 361.
129. See Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919, 923 (D. Md. 1958).
130. It is a well-established rule in Maryland that restrictive covenants may be utilized
to prevent the "future misuse of trade secrets" by employees. E.L. Conwell & Co.
v. Gutberlet, 429 F.2d 527, 528 (4th Cir. 1970) (citing Ruhl v. F.A. Bartlett Tree
Expert Co., 245 Md. 118, 225 A.2d 288 (1967); Silver v. Goldberger, 231 Md. 1,
188 A.2d 155 (1963); Tawney v. Mutual Sys., Inc., 186 Md. 508, 47 A.2d 372
(1946)).
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trade secret or confidentiality provisions.' 3 ' For example, in Head Ski
Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 132 the parties entered into an agreement whereby
the employee promised not to "divulge or impart any trade secret or
company's business to any person, firm or corporation whatsoever."' 133
The phrase "or company's business" arguably includes more than trade
secrets in the usual sense. Although the issue was not raised, and al-
though the covenant was being applied to a trade secret, the court, nev-
ertheless, upheld the enforceability of the covenant, notwithstanding its
arguable overbreadth.' 34 Similarly, in Ellicott Machine Corp. v. Wiley
Manufacturing Co., '31 the employment contract at issue provided:
[Ilt is understood that all drawings and any other datafurnished
you for use on the five purchase orders are for your sole use
only in performance of those orders. It is further understood
that the drawings and information contained thereon, and
any other data, are not to be divulged to other parties or used
any way not in the best interest of Ellicott Machine
Corporation. 13
6
Again, although the language could have been attacked for its over-
breadth, it was not. The provisions in Ellicott and Head are not neces-
sarily broader than needed to protect the interests of the employer, but
it is significant that the courts enforced the provisions without even
considering this concept. In Tawney v. Mutual System, Inc., '37 the con-
tractual provision which was enforced by the court required the em-
ployer of the loan company "to keep secret the names of or any
information relative to any past, present or prospective borrowers from
and customers of their employers."' 38 Again, although an argument
could have been mounted against the breadth of the provision, no such
argument was raised. Finally, in C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer Dynamics
Corp., 139 the court of appeals applied a broadly worded trade secret
provision to confidential information without specifically deciding
whether such information actually constituted a "trade secret." 4 ' The
employee in C-E-I-R, Inc. had agreed not to "publish or disclose any
data or information related to [his] work for C-E-I-R, Inc. of which [he
had] knowledge."'' The information at issue concerned a prospective
contract and, although such ephemeral information normally does not
131. See, e.g.., Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F. Supp. 919, 923 (D. Md. 1958).
132. 158 F. Supp. 919 (D. Md. 1958).
133. Id at 921 (emphasis added).
134. Id at 924.
135. 297 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Md. 1969).
136. Id at 1051 (emphasis added).
137. 186 Md. 508, 47 A.2d 372 (1946).
138. Id at 511, 47 A.2d at 378 (emphasis added).
139. 229 Md. 357, 183 A.2d 374 (1962).
140. Id at 368, 183 A.2d at 380.
141. Id at 360, 183 A.2d at 376 (emphasis added).
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constitute a trade secret, 142 the court held that the use of the informa-
tion violated the covenant and that such use was, therefore,
actionable. 143
Although Maryland courts have not squarely faced the question of
whether trade secret covenants can be overly broad, other jurisdictions
have. Section 104 of the Master and Servant Section of American Juris-
prudence Second states:
An agreement which has been entered into between em-
ployer and employee, and which obligates the employee not
to disclose the secrets of the employer s business, is valid and
enforceable, although such a contract may be deemed invalid
if it goes beyond the limits necessary to protect the employer's
interests. The contract will not be enforced unless the obliga-
tion which is thereby imposed appears to be reasonably neces-
sary to the protection of the employer's interests, which
depends upon the peculiar facts in each case.'"
The New Jersey case of Taylor Iron & Steel Co. v. Nichols 45 is illustra-
tive of the above principle. The agreement in Taylor prohibited the
employee from divulging any information "relating to or regarding any
process of steel-making" without regard to whether or not such infor-
mation was secret information. 46 Employing words not dissimilar to
the Maryland general rule in regard to restrictive covenants, the court
in Taylor refused to enforce the contractual provision because "a con-
tract in restraint of trade will not be enforced unless the restraint is no
more than is reasonably required to protect the interests of the party in
favor of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the
interests of the public."' 47
142. The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1938) states, in part, that a true
trade secret
differs from other secret information in a business ... in that it is not
simply information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of the
business, as, for example, the amount or other terms of a secret bid for a
contract or the salary of certain employees, or the security investments
made or contemplated, or the date fixed for the announcement of a new
policy or for bringing out a new model or the like.
Id
143. C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357, 369-70, 183 A.2d 374,
381 (1962).
144. 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master & Servant § 104, at 176 (1970 & Supp. 1981).
145. 73 N.J. Eq. 684, 69 A. 186 (1908).
146. Id at 687, 69 A. at 186.
147. Id at 686, 69 A. at 187. See also Julius Hyman & Co. v. Velsicol Corp., 123 Colo.
563, 233 P.2d 977 (1951), where the court stated:
Whether aprovision in an employment agreement requiring secrecy
is enforceable, depends upon whether such a contract is reasonable, and
this is dependent upon the peculiar facts in each case. Generally it may
be said that an agreement by an employee, binding him to hold secret
confidential information or knowledge acquired by him during his em-
ployment, and afterwards, and which is necessary for the protection of
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Unlike the situation with other restrictive covenants, however, an
employer in Maryland does not run the risk of losing all protection if
an overly broad confidentiality provision is deemed unenforceable. If
the employer can prove that the material being used or disclosed is a
trade secret, 4 8 the employer has the right to enjoin its use and disclo-
sure even absent an employment agreement. 49 Accordingly, it may
the employer's business and is reasonable in its terms, will be upheld as
valid.
Id at 610-11, 233 P.2d at 1002.
148. Maryland courts have consistently adopted the description of a trade secret
presented in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1938). See Servomation Mathias,
Inc. v. Englert, 333 F. Supp. 9, 15 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (applying Maryland law); El-
licott Mach. Corp. v. Wiley Mfg. Co., 297 F. Supp. 1044, 1053 (D. Md. 1969);
Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R.E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 110, 208 A.2d 74, 82, reh'g
denied and opinion supplemented 238 Md. 129, 208 A.2d 699, cert. denied, 382 U.S.
843 (1965).
The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1938) lists various factors
to be used in determining if confidential information constitutes a trade secret.
These include:
1. the extent to which the information is known outside of [the]
business;
2. the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in
[the] business;
3. the extent of measures taken by [the employer] to guard the secrecy
of the information;
4. the value of the information to [the employer] and to his
competitors;
5. the amount of effort or money expended by [the employer] in devel-
oping the information;
6. the ease or difficulty with which the information would be properly
acquired or duplicated by others.
Id These factors are favorably quoted in Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R.E. Darling
Co., 238 Md. at 110, 208 A.2d at 82.
The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment b (1938) further describes the
subject matter to which the above factors may apply:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or com-
pilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives
the employer an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical com-
pound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a
pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.
Id This language is cited with approval in Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R.E. Darling
Co., 238 Md. at 105, 208 A.2d at 79, and in Mycalex Corp. v. Pemco Corp., 64 F.
Supp. 420, 423 (D. Md. 1946), qff'd, 159 F.2d 907 (4th Cir. 1947).
149. A party is not privileged to reveal trade secrets even in the absence of an agree-
ment or covenant. "The duty to protect an employer's trade secrets exists apart
from a contract embodying the obligation." Head Ski Co. v. Kam Ski Co., 158 F.
Supp. 919, 923 (D. Md. 1958) (citing DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Mas-
land, 244 U.S. 100 (1917); Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter Prods., 230 F.2d 855,
864 (4th Cir. 1956); RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 396(b) (1933)). Various Mary-
land cases have recognized the protection of trade secrets outside of the contrac-
tual setting. See Mycalex Corp. v. Pemco Corp., 64 F. Supp. 420 (D. Md. 1946),
aft'd, 159 F.2d 907 (4th Cir. 1947); Space Aero Prods. Co. v. R.E. Darling Co., 238
Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74, reh'g denied and opinion supplemented, 238 Md. 129, 208
A.2d 699, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965).
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make good sense to be somewhat overbroad with respect to trade secret
provisions, so long as the employer brings both a tort and contract ac-
tion if suit is ever filed.'
50
VI. CONCLUSION
The recommendations and analyses presented in this article can
best come to life by example and, for that reason, a set of sample re-
strictive covenants is included as an appendix. The set is not meant to
apply to all situations and, in light of the ad hoc nature of the cases and
the many unanswered questions left by Maryland courts, there can be
no guarantees that these provisions will be enforceable. Nevertheless,
they are good examples of how such covenants can be written in light
of applicable case law.
Notwithstanding the pitfalls which exist in regard to restrictive
covenants found in employment agreements, the law in Maryland con-
tinues to favor the employer, and carefully drawn covenants should
generally be enforced. In fact, the law in Maryland is much the same
as it was in 1936 when the court of appeals in To/man Laundry v.
Walker 15 ' established the theme that the customers and patronage se-
cured by an employee for the benefit of the employer, and the resulting
increased good will, become the property of the employer, however
much their procurement is attributable to the employee's energy, per-
sonality, and skill.'52 Since the employee was hired and rewarded to
produce these results, the employer has the right to their enjoyment, 53
and a carefully drawn restrictive covenant can protect the employer's
right to the maximum extent possible.
150. In fact, in Taylor Iron & Steel Co. v. Nichols, 73 N.J. Eq. 684, 69 A. 186 (1908),
the employer successfully restrained the use of its trade secrets under its tort count
even though the contract was found to be overbroad and unenforceable.
151. 171 Md. 7, 187 A. 836 (1936).
152. Id at 12, 187 A. at 838.
153. Id
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APPENDIX
Restrictive Covenant Excerpt from Standard
Employment Agreement
The Employee acknowledges that his employment with the Com-
pany will, of necessity, provide him with specialized knowledge, which,
if used in competition with the Company could cause serious harm to
the Company. Accordingly, the Employee agrees:
a. For a period of one (1) year after he is no longer employed by
the Company, the Employee will not engage, directly or indirectly,
either as proprietor, stockholder, partner, officer, employee or other-
wise, in any business which manufactures or sells products similar to
those manufactured or sold by the Company at any time during the
two (2) years preceding the Employee's termination of employment
with the Company in any geographic area where the Company manu-
factured or sold products at any time during the two (2) years preced-
ing such termination of employment.
b. For a period of eighteen (18) months after the Employee is no
longer employed by the Company, the Employee will not, directly or
indirectly, either as proprietor, stockholder, partner, officer, employee
or otherwise, sell, offer to sell, or solicit any orders for the purchase of
any products which are similar to those manufactured or sold by the
Company during the two (2) years preceding the Employee's termina-
tion of employment with the Company, to or from any person, firm or
entity which was a customer of the Company during the two (2) years
preceding such termination of employment.
c. For a period of two (2) years after the Employee is no longer
employed by the Company, the Employee will not, directly or indi-
rectly, either as proprietor, stockholder, partner, officer, employee or
otherwise, sell, offer to sell, or solicit any orders for the purchase of any
products which are similar to those manufactured or sold by the Com-
pany during the two (2) years preceding the Employee's termination of
employment with the Company, to or from any person, firm or entity
which was a customer of the Company from whom the Employee solic-
ited orders on behalf of the Company during the two (2) years preced-
ing such termination of employment.
d. The Employee will not at any time during or after his employ-
ment by the Company, directly or indirectly, disclose to others any con-
fidential information of the Company. While engaged as an employee
of the Company, the Employee may only use confidential information
of the Company for a purpose which is necessary to the carrying out of
the Employee's duties as an employee of the Company, and the Em-
ployee may not make use of any confidential information of the Com-
pany after he is no longer an employee of the Company. All
information, whether written or otherwise, regarding the Company's
business, including information regarding customers, customer lists,
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costs, prices, earnings, products, formulae, compositions, machines, ap-
paratus, systems, manufacturing procedures, prospective and executed
contracts and other business arrangements, and sources of supply are
presumed to be confidential information of the Company for purposes
of this Agreement, except to the extent that such information may be
otherwise lawfully and readily available to the general public. The
Employee further agrees that he will, upon termination of his employ-
ment with the Company, return to the Company all books, records, lists
and other written, typed or printed materials, whether furnished by the
Company or prepared by the Employee, which contain any informa-
tion relating to the Company's business, and the Employee agrees that
he will neither make nor retain any copies of such materials after termi-
nation of employment.
e. The provisions of subparagraphs a, b, c and d are cumulative.
If any time period provided in subparagraphs a, b or c exceeds the time
the Employee has been employed by the Company, then such time pe-
riod will be deemed reduced to equal the time the Employee was em-
ployed by the Company. With respect to subparagraphs b and c, the
customers of the Company include all persons, firms or entities which
have purchased products from the Company during the relevant time
periods, and all persons, firms or entities which control, or are con-
trolled by the same person, firm or entity which controls such purchas-
ers. In the event of a breach or threatened breach by the Employee of
the provisions of subparagraphs a, b, c or d, the Company will be enti-
tled to an injunction restraining the Employee from such breach and
from rendering any services to any person, firm, or entity in breach of
such paragraphs. Compliance with subparagraphs a, b, c and d is a
condition precedent to the Company's obligation to make any pay-
ments of any nature to the Employee. The Employee further agrees to
indemnify and hold harmless the Company from all damages and
costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, relating to the enforcement
of subparagraphs a, b, c or d, incurred by the Company arising out of
the Employee's breach or threatened breach of subparagraphs a, b, c or
d. Nothing in this Agreement will be construed as prohibiting the
Company from pursuing any other remedies available to it for a breach
or threatened breach of subparagraphs a, b, c or d. The provisions of
subparagraphs a, b, c, d and e will survive the termination of this
Agreement.
